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CRIMINAL LAW  
Summary 
 A multi-faceted appeal from a Second Judicial District Court conviction of first-degree 
murder.   
Disposition/Outcome  
 District Court’s conviction upheld.   
Factual and Procedural History 
 On July 7, 2006, nurse Chaz Higgs (“Higgs”) noted to a coworker, Kim Ramey 
(“Ramey”), that the appropriate way to “get rid of someone” was to use succinylcholine.  
Succinylcholine is an anti-paralytic drug used largely in emergency medical situations.  
Suspiciously, the next day Higgs called emergency personnel after finding his wife, Kathy 
Augustine (“Augustine”) unresponsive in their home.  After learning of Augustine’s ailment, 
Ramey reported to police and treating physicians that she conversed the day before with Higgs 
and suspected that succinylcholine contributed to Augustine’s condition.  Augustine’s treating 
physician took a urine sample to test for succinylcholine.  Three days later, Augustine died after 
removal from life support.  In determining Augustine’s cause of death, investigators sent the 
urine sample to the FBI.  Toxicologist Madeline Montgomery (“Montgomery”) of the FBI issued 
a report showing the presence of succinylcholine in Augustine.   
 Police arrested Higgs in September 2006 and he was formally charged with first-degree 
murder of Augustine in December 2006.  Both sides stipulated to a trial date of July 2007.  
During trial preparation, expert examination of the urine sample was important to both the State 
and the defendant.  Both parties agreed that Montgomery worked cooperatively with defense 
expert Chip Walls (“Walls”).  In May 2007, defense counsel moved for a continuance to allow 
Walls more time to evaluate the FBI’s test results.  The lower court denied the motion, reasoning 
that the defense waited too long to request more time and Walls possessed sufficient knowledge 
about the FBI toxicology report and methodology.   
 Higgs’ trial began June 18, 2007.  The State presented witnesses that described the 
troubled marital relationship between Higgs and Augustine and Higgs’ unemotional response to 
Augustine’s death.  Similarly, Ramey testified about the conservation she had with the 
defendant, where he noted the appropriate way to “get rid of someone.”  The State also presented 
testimony of medical personnel who explained that a nurse, like Higgs, would be familiar with 
the use of succinylcholine and would be able to obtain it without difficulty.  Police officers 
testified that Higgs possessed materials discussing the administration of succinylcholine.   
 Expert scientific evidence was critical throughout the trial.  Augustine’s attending 
physicians ruled out mundane causes of death, such as heart attack or stroke, and explained that 
succinylcholine poisoning could have been the cause of death.  The physicians also emphasized 
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that the hospital never administered the drug during the course of Augustine’s treatment.  A 
toxicologist explained that a tissue sample from Augustine contained a puncture wound, but it 
was unclear whether succinylcholine was injected into the tissue.  A pathologist for the defense 
testified that the puncture wound in the tissue sample was too fresh to have occurred prior to 
Augustine’s arrival at the hospital.  Most importantly, Montgomery explained the volatile 
chemical nature and effects of succinylcholine and the ways experts test samples for the drug.  
Montgomery also testified that succinylcholine was present in Augustine’s urine prior to her 
death.  Although defense expert Walls did not testify during the trial, defense counsel used 
information obtained during his investigation during cross-examination of Montgomery. 
 Ultimately, a jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder.  He appealed on 
numerous grounds.  The Court initially decided the appeal in an unpublished opinion issued May 
2009.  After the Nevada Justice Association moved for publication, the Court published the 
decision in January 2010.  
Discussion 
Motion to continue the trial 
 Writing for a majority of four, Justice Hardesty began by noting that the Nevada Supreme 
Court reviews motions for continuance for an abuse of discretion.
2
  Abuse of discretion usually 
occurs where a litigant has inadequate time to prepare for trial and is prejudiced by denial of a 
continuance.
3
  The Court noted the defendant did not demonstrate prejudice and went on to 
observe that the State and its expert witness worked cooperatively in providing information to 
the defendant.  Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the defendant had approximately six months 
to evaluate the FBI’s toxicology report and had numerous opportunities to request additional 
time prior to May 2007.  Finally, the Court concluded that the lower Court did not abuse its 
discretion by denying Defendant’s motion to continue.   
Sufficiency of the evidence 
 When evaluating evidence sufficiency, the Nevada Supreme Court views evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution and considers whether any rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential criminal elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
4
  Because the State 
produced evidence that linked the defendant to succinylcholine, cleared the hospital of 
administering the drug, provided a motive, and demonstrated Augustine’s cause of death, the 
Court held there was enough to support the major elements of first-degree murder.  
Expert testimony 
 In order to clarify prior confusion in Nevada law, Justice Hardesty discussed at length the 
judiciary’s role as gatekeepers for expert testimony.   
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 Rose v. State, 123 Nev. 194, 206, 163 P3d 408, 416 (2007).  
3
 Zessman v. State, 94 Nev. 28, 31, 573 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1978).  
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 Rose v. State, 123 Nev. 194, 202, 163 P.3d 408, 414 (2007) (quoting Origel-Candido v. State, 114 Nev. 378, 381, 
956 P.2d 1378, 1380 (1998)).   
 The Court began with an assessment of the United States Supreme Court decision in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.
5
  In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court 
liberalized admission of expert witness testimony to be more compatible with Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702.
6
  The Supreme Court noted the importance of relevance and reliability in expert 
testimony
7
 and gave a sizeable, though non-exhaustive, list of factors a court may wish to 
evaluate.
8
  Writing in dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the majority’s list of factors 
undermines discretion in assessing cases on their individual fact patterns and potentially causes 
confusion.  
 Although later United States Supreme Court opinions attempted to clarify that Daubert 
factors are not exhaustive and meant to be flexible, Chief Justice Hardesty noted a survey of 
Circuit Court opinions which demonstrated that the factors have been inconsistently used and 
often understood as a mandate.  
 Applying Daubert to Nevada law, the Court noted that state precedent mirrors Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s concerns about rigid application of the enumerated Daubert factors.  
Particularly in the case of Hallmark v. Eldridge, the Nevada Supreme Court noted that Daubert 
is only persuasive when understood to endorse a flexible approach to judicial gate keeping and 
has never been fully adopted.
9
  Although the Court largely agreed with the importance of 
relevance and reliability, the majority noted that Nevada law, as codified in NRS 50.275 suggests 
three elements for admission of expert witness testimony.  These factors are intended to create an 
inquiry based in law, rather than scientific principles.  First, the expert must be qualified.  
Second, testimony must assist the jury.  Third, the expert may not testify beyond the scope of 
their expertise.  The Court then strongly emphasized that factors are not meant to be exhaustive 
and judicial discretion is supported.  
 Lastly, the Court considered whether the lower court abused its discretion by admitting 
Montgomery’s testimony.  Because Montgomery possessed scientific credentials and training, 
she was a qualified expert.  Testimony about succinylcholine’s chemical property and presence 
in Augustine’s urine was useful to cause of death and assisted the jury.  Lastly, Montgomery 
discussed only particular information on scientific testing.  Thus, the Court concluded that the 
lower court properly allowed Montgomery to testify.  
Jury instructions regarding spoliation of evidence  
 Next, the Court considered whether Higgs’ should have received a spoliation jury 
instruction.  Citing Daniels v. State, the Court noted that the State’s failure to preserve material 
evidence may support a spoliation instruction or dismissal, if the defendant can show bad faith or 
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 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (replacing the “general acceptance in the 
particular field” approach previously required by Frye v. United States).   
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 Id. at 588.   
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 Such factors include whether the evidence has been tested, subjected to peer review and publication, has known 
potential error rates, or if it is generally or widely accepted.  Id. at 593-94.   
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 Hallmark v. Eldrige, 124 Nev. ___, ___, 189 P.3d 646, 650 (2008).   
prejudice.
10
  Because Higgs did not allege bad faith and the State did not benefit from the alleged 
poor preservation, the Court quickly rejected this point.  
Accumulation of plain error 
 Finally, the Court considered eleven instances of plain error that Higgs alleged occurred 
throughout the trial.  Because defense counsel did not object to any of the errors when they 
occurred, the Court noted that reversal is only available where a defendant’s substantial rights 
are affected by actual prejudice or there is a miscarriage of justice.
11
  After reviewing the case, 
the Court held that none of the alleged errors rose to the high standard.  
Concurring/Dissenting Opinion 
 Justice Cherry concurred with the majority’s rejection of Daubert, but would have 
reversed Higgs’ conviction.  Justice Cherry reasoned that there was no earth-shattering reason to 
proceed to trial without fully completing discovery.  Although defense counsel did not 
specifically claim the expediency caused prejudice, the defense expert’s failure to testify resulted 
in sufficient harm because toxicology was critical to the State’s case.  Furthermore, because 
discovery is an important component of confrontation
12
 and relates to an individual’s capability 
to effectively cross-examine, it was a violation of Higgs’ due process rights to deny a motion to 
continue the trial.  
Concurring/Dissenting Opinion 
 Justice Saitta also concurred with the majority’s rejection of Daubert and would have 
reversed Higgs’ conviction for due process reasons.  Opining that defense expert Walls needed 
more time to evaluate the FBI toxicology report, Justice Saitta reasoned that the lower court 
abused its discretion by failing to accommodate the defendant’s right to discovery.  
Conclusion 
 The Court denied all of Higgs’ arguments on appeal and upheld the lower court’s 
conviction.  In order to resolve confusion about expert witness testimony the Court reaffirmed 
that judges have much discretion in determining whether to admit an expert’s testimony.  
Although the factors listed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Company may be persuasive authority, 
state law encourages judges to use legal principles to assess cases on their own facts.   
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